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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over this Appeal is pursuant to Rules 3 and 4, 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court and 78-2-2 (3 )(j) , Utah Code 
Annotated. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an Appeal from a Summary Judgment in favor of 
Plaint i ff /Respondent, City Consumer Services, Inc., granted by 
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby, Second Judicial District Court, Davis 
County, State of Utah, dated November 18, 1988 (R. 94-96). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Whether granting Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment 
was error in that genuine issues of material fact existed to be 
determined. 
Did the lower Court, in view of the facts and circumstances 
of this case, improperly conclude that the Utah "One-Action Rule" 
(78-37-1 U.C.A.) did not apply to this case on the basis that 
Respondent unilaterally determined it would not be financially 
expedient to foreclose its Trust Deed although there was 
sufficient value in the subject property at the time of 
foreclosure of the senior lien to satisfy the obligation owing to 
Respondent by Appellant? 
Is Respondent barred by both the "One-Action Rule" and 
57-1-32 U.C.A. from pursuing its claimed deficiency against 
Appellant? 
Did the lower Court follow existing case law and the Utah 
Rules of Procedure in awarding attorney's fees and costs to 
Respondent? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, Title 78-37-1, as amended. 
Utah Code Annotated, Title 57-1-32, as amended. 
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 54(d)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, Vera Hess Peters, was the owner of real property 
(condominium) located at 1245 East Siesta Drive, Salt Lake 
County, Utah, which was subject to an obligation (Trust Deed and 
Note) owing to Prudential Federal Savings in the amount of 
$54,420.00. Appellant applied for and obtained a loan from 
Respondent, City Consumer Services, Inc., on or about April 30, 
1981 for the principal sum of $19,500.00, evidenced by a Note 
sued on by Respondent (R. 6) secured by a Second Trust Deed of 
even date on the subject real property, recorded May 5, 1981. 
(R. 27, para. 4; R. 44-47) 
Appellant sold her interest in the subject real property on 
or about May 6, 1981, by Uniform Real Estate Contract which was 
recorded at the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder as Entry 
No. 3672262. (See Appendix A) The purchaser under the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract assumed, as part of the purchase price of 
$84,500.00, the First Trust Deed obligation to Prudential Federal 
Savings ($54,353.70) and the Second Trust Deed obligation to 
Respondent ($18,761.00). (See Appendix A) Respondent claims 
notice of this sale was given to Appellant (R. 20-21, para. 9; 
R. 35, para. 2) 
Respondent, prior to granting the loan to Appellant, had the 
subject real property appraised, which established its market 
value at $92,500.00 on April 25, 1981. (R. 48-50) Respondent, 
with actual knowledge of the senior lien obligation owing to 
Prudential Federal Savings, made the loan to Appellant based on 
this appraisal, determining that the combined obligations equaled 
eight (80%) percent of the appraised value of the subject 
property. (R. 50) 
Payments were made on both Trust Deeds until approximately 
October, 1986, a period of more than five (5) years. (R. 20, 
para. 7; R. 27, para. 6) Payments made to Respondent totaled 
$17,599.30. (R. 35, para. 3) A default occurred when the 
purchaser from Appellant discontinued making payments and the 
senior lien holder, Prudential, commenced foreclosure of its 
senior Trust Deed to a Trustee's Sale on or about June 22, 1987. 
(R. 21, para. 11; R. 27, para. 5) Respondent took no action to 
protect its security interest in the subject property or pursue 
foreclosure of its Trust Deed because, "it did not believe there 
was an economic justification to do so." (R. 21, para. 12) 
Respondent's second appraisal of the subject property dated 
January 18, 1987 established a market value for the subject 
property of $70,250.00 at the time of foreclosure and sale by the 
senior lien holder, Prudential. The amount owing to Prudential 
was approximately $50,000.00. Based on the market value of the 
January, 1987 appraisal (R. 51-53), there was additional value of 
$20,000.00 in the subject property to satisfy the obligation 
owing to Respondent of $17,082.42 as of July 15, 1988 (R. 21, 
para. 12; R. 28, para. 9) 
Plaintiff commenced its action on the Note October 21, 1987, 
for $17,082.42 due with interest. (R. 1-5) After discovery, 
(R. 13-18) Respondent filed its Motion for Summary Judgment with 
supporting Memorandum and Affidavit. (R. 19-31) Appellant filed 
her Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Motion to Dismiss with attached exhibits in that the 
action of Plaintiff, in substance, sought a deficiency judgment 
without compliance with 78-37-1 U.C.A. (1953 amended) "The One-
Action Rule." (R. 34-53) Respondent then delayed hearing on its 
Motion for Summary Judgment until filing of its response to 
Appellant's Memorandum. (Rtt 54-55; R. 62-68) The Motion for 
Summary Judgment was heard September 27, 1988. The District 
Court, by ruling dated September 29, 1988, granted Respondent's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis, (1) Appellant's 
p l e a d i n g s and Memorandum was " i n s u f f i c i e n t t o show t h e r e i s an 
i s s u e of f a c t ; " (2) That the One-Action Rule (78-31-1 U.C.A.) i s 
not a p p l i c a b l e t o t h i s case in t h a t a f t e r t he f o r e c l o s u r e and 
s a l e of t h e s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y by t h e s e n i o r l i e n h o l d e r , 
P r u d e n t i a l , t h e r e was no p r o p e r t y to f o r e c l o s e on ; (3) The 
P l a i n t i f f (Respondent) i s not r equ i r ed to go through a f r u i t l e s s 
p r o c e d u r e . (R. 79) 
Respondent filed its Motion for Determination of Attorney's 
Fees based on Affidavit which was heard by the District Court, 
November 1, 1988. (R. 82-92) After objection to the sufficiency 
of the Affidavit and failure to file the proper Memorandum of 
Costs, the Court allowed counsel for Respondent to testify. 
(T.9;R.93) The lower Court awarded attorney's fees at the rate 
of $100.00 per hour, with fees for paralegal and an associate. 
(T. 10-11) The award of attorney's fees and costs was 
incorporated by Respondent in the Summary Judgment, November 18, 
1988. (R. 94-96) Notice of Appeal was timely filed December 5, 
1988. (R. 98-99) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RAISED ISSUES OF FACT THAT COULD NOT 
PROPERLY BE DISPOSED OF THROUGH SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The action brought by Respondent against Appellant, in 
substance, seeks a deficiency judgment without foreclosure of its 
Second Trust Deed in compliance with Section 78-37-1, U.C.A. 
(1953 amended), commonly referred to as the "One-Action Rule." 
The case of First Security Bank of Utah v. Felger, 658 Fed. Supp. 
175, 181 (D. Ut. 1987) established that the Utah "One-Action 
Rule" applies to Trust Deeds as well as mortgages. (See also 
Utah Mortgage & Loan Company v. Black, 618 P.2d 43, (Ut. 1980); 
Lockhart Company v. Equitable Realty Company, 658 P.2d 1333 (Ut. 
1983) Title 78-37-1 provides: 
There can be one action for recovery of any debt or 
enforcement of any rights secured solely by mortgage 
upon real estate, which action must be in accordance 
with the provisions of this chapter. 
It is undisputed that Respondent did not foreclosure its Trust 
Deed and exhaust the security before bringing action against 
Appellant. Respondent, in attempting to escape its 
responsibility, claimed it came within the exception to the "One-
Action Rule" where the security was allegedly lost through no 
fault of its own. (R. 29-30;T.4-6) The undisputed facts of this 
case and law clearly do not support Respondent's claim that it 
comes within the exception to the "One-Action Rule" which is a 
material issue of fact to be determined by evidence as opposed to 
Summary Judgment. 
The market value of the subject property, at the time of the 
foreclosure and sale by the senior lien holder, Prudential, 
established by appraisal obtained by Respondent January 18, 1987, 
was $70,250.00 (R. 51-53) The subject property had a value over 
and above the senior lien to Prudential of $20,000.00, more than 
enough to satisfy the remaining obligation owing to Respondent by 
Appellant. (R. 21; R. 28) Under the cited section and 78-37-2, 
there is no personal liability on the part of Appellant, as a 
mortgagor, until after a foreclosure sale of the security, and 
then only for the deficiency remaining unpaid. Bank of Ephraim 
v. Davis, 581, P.2d 1001 (Ut. 1978); First National Bank v. 
Boley, 90 Ut. 341, 61 P.2d 621 (1936) The Supreme Court of Utah, 
in the case of Lockhart Company v. Equitable Realty, Inc., 657 
P.2d 1333 (Ut. 1983) said: 
The security must be, in fact, exhausted and a 
deficiency established to a certainty in order to 
permit a junior mortgagee to bring an action on the 
note without first exhausting the security; 
A material issue of fact existed at the time of hearing of the 
Motion for Summary Judgment with regard to the value of the 
security interest of Respondent and whether or not Respondent had 
in fact met its responsibility by law in exhausting the security 
before bringing its action for deficiency. The facts in this 
case clearly establish that the subject property had value over 
and above the senior lien obligation at the time of foreclosure 
and sale. Thus, a critical issue of fact to the entire case 
precluding granting a Summary Judgment, is whether Respondent's 
failure to protect its security interest, and not preventing the 
foreclosure by the senior lien holder with resulting loss of the 
value of its security constitutes "fault" barring Respondent from 
seeking a deficiency judgment. Respondent, totally aware of the 
foreclosure action by the senior lien holder, had the subject 
property appraised, and established that its security had value. 
(R. 51-53; T. 3-6) Respondent took no action to cure the senior 
lien default or bid at the foreclosure sale in that it did not 
believe there was economic justification for doing so. (R. para. 
12; T. 3-6) This statement by Respondent, and the additional 
conclusory statement contained in its responsive Memorandum, not 
supported by Affidavit, to-wit: 
(c) The junior lien holder would have to advance 
its own funds to pay off the debt owing to the 
senior lien holder. It would thereby tie up funds 
which could otherwise be lent out at the market 
rates. It must take into account the actual cost 
it would incur in managing, reconditioning and 
preparing the property for marketing. It must also 
consider the actual costs it would incur in selling 
the property. (R.65-66; T.4-6) 
is purely speculative, constitutes a material issue of fact which 
would preclude the lower Court granting Summary Judgment, if not 
sufficient to bar the action. (See Lockhart v. Equitable Realty 
(supra 1336) 
In order for Respondent to escape the provisions of the 
"One-Action Rule" it must prove by a preponderance that the 
security was lost or disposed of without any fault or blame or 
conduct on its part. Utah Mortgage & Loan Company v. Black, 618 
P.2d 43 (Ut. 1980) The Utah Supreme Court in Black reversed the 
granting of a Summary Judgment by the lower District Court on the 
basis that the allegation Plaintiff's action was barred by the 
"One-Action Rule," where Plaintiff failed to proceed under 
Section 78-37-1, U.C.A. was a disputed question of fact, 
necessitating that the Summary Judgment be vacated and the case 
remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent 
with the Court's opinion. At page 45, the Court said: 
"However, if the security is lost or disposed of 
because of any failure or neglect of the creditor, he 
deprives himself both of the right to foreclose on the 
security and to seek a deficiency from the debtor, 
(citation) 
The lower Court's ruling that Defendant did not file an 
Affidavit controverting the Affidavit of Kathleen Hackett and her 
reliance on allegations and denials in her pleadings was 
insufficient to show there is an issue of fact is misplaced. 
(R. 19) In Lockhart v. Equitable Realty (supra), this Court 
stated at page 1335: 
In the instant case, Defendant's affirmative defense 
and Motion to Dismiss based upon Lockhart's failure 
to comply with the provisions of U.C.A. 1953, 
78-37-1, precludes the granting of Summary Judgment 
in favor of Lockhart. . . . it was, therefore, 
unnecessary for Defendants to submit opposing 
Affidavits as to the issue in order to comply with 
Rule 56(e) supra, because the issue was sufficiently 
raised in their Answer and Motion to Dismiss and was 
uncontroverted by Lockhart's Affidavits. 
Respondent, in its Memorandum in support of the Motion for 
Summary Judgment, (Argument I) recognized the applicability of 
the "One-Action Rule," but claimed it came within the exception. 
(R. 29-30) Appellant filed her Motion to Dismiss based upon 
Respondent's failure to comply with 78-37-1. Granting the Motion 
for Summary Judgment, in part, that Appellant did not file 
controverting Affidavits was error. 
The value of Respondent's security interest was lost due to 
its failure and neglect to take timely action to cure the default 
and avoid foreclosure of the senior lien. Respondent's failure 
to exhaust its security interest as required by law, primarily on 
the basis of its unilateral, speculative decision, "that it did 
not believe there was economic justification for doing so," does 
not meet the test of the exception to the "One-Action Rule," 
to-wit: the security has been lost without Respondent's fault or 
negligence. This critical issue was addressed in Lockhart v. 
Equitable Realty (supra): 
In accordance with precedent and clear intent of 
the statute (78-31-1) we hold that it is not 
enough to speculate that the security is valueless 
or might become valueless if foreclosed by the 
senior lien holder,. Rather, the security must be, 
in fact, exhausted and a deficiency established to 
a certainty in order for the exception to apply. 
We further rely upon Zions Savings Bank & Trust 
Company v. Rouse, where this Court held: Even 
where at the time of the giving of the mortgage 
there were mortgages prior to the Plaintiff's 
mortgage of such amounts as to take up the entire 
value of the property, the Plaintiff was still 
compelled to foreclose his subsequent mortgage and 
come against the general assets of the Defendant 
only by way of a deficiency judgment, (emphasis added) 
The lower Court granting Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment 
on the basis that there was a senior lien foreclosure of the 
property on June 22, 1987; and that Plaintiff did not bid at the 
sale because it believed that there was not economic 
justification for doing so; and after sale there was no property 
to foreclose on; and the Plaintiff was not required to go through 
a fruitless procedure, was error and contrary to law. The 
evidence and facts in this case clearly establish Respondent's 
security was not valueless. Respondent intentionally failed to 
exhaust its security and establish a deficiency, if any, to a 
certainty. Lockhart v. Equitable Realty, Inc. (supra) Mere 
speculation that the security is insufficient or may become such, 
will not suffice to relieve Respondent of its obligation. As a 
matter of law, Respondent, having failed to comply with U.C.A. 
78-37-1, should be precluded from pursuing its action on the Note 
against Appellant. The granting of the Summary Judgment by the 
lower Court should be reversed. The Motion of Appellant to 
dismiss the action of Respondent should be granted. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT IS BARRED BY BOTH 78-37-1 AND 57-1-32, U.C.A. 
FROM PURSUING ITS CLAIMED DEFICIENCY AGAINST APPELLANT, 
As stated, the action of Respondent against Appellant, in 
substance, seeks a deficiency judgment without foreclosure of its 
Second Trust Deed in compliance with 78-37-1 U.C.A. The 
undisputed facts establish Respondent's security interest had 
substantial value at the time of foreclosure and sale by the 
senior lien holder, Prudential. Respondent took no action to 
protect its security interest, did not exhaust the security and 
allowed it to be lost. These facts, which closely parallel those 
in Lockhart (supra), clearly establish the applicability of 
78-37-1 U.C.A. "One-Action Rule" in this case. Respondent cannot 
escape its statutory and legal responsibility by a decision based 
on speculation, "that there was not economic justification for 
doing so." (R. 21) Utah case law clearly and unequivocably 
requires the creditor (Respondent here) to comply with the 
statute (78-3 7-1) and exhaust the security before proceeding with 
an action on the Note for deficiency. Lockhart v. Equitable 
Realty Company, Inc. (supra); Utah Mortgage v. Black (supra); 
Bank of Ephraim v. Davis (supra); First National Bank v. Boley 
(supra). The failure to comply with the "One-Action Rule," as in 
this case, is a bar to the action of Respondent which would 
preclude recovery of any deficiency against Appellant. 
Respondent makes reference to Utah Code Annotated 57-1-32 in 
its Memorandum in support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment as a basis for award of attorney's fees and costs in a 
deficiency action. (R. 29) Had Respondent proceeded properly, 
which it should have done in this case, and cured the default of 
the senior lien owing to Prudential, and pursued foreclosure of 
its Trust Deed in compliance with the Utah Trust Deed Act, 
(57-1-19 to 57-1-36 U.C.A.) Respondent would not have been 
entitled to a Deficiency Judgment in view of the undisputed 
facts. 57-1-32 U.C.A. provides: 
At any time within three (3) months after any 
sale of property under a Trust Deed, as hereinabove 
provided, an action may be commenced to recover the 
balance due upon the obligation for which the Trust 
Deed was given as security, and in such action the 
Complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the 
indebtedness which was secured by such Trust Deed, 
the amount for which such property was sold, and 
the fair market value thereof at the date of sale. 
Before rendering judgment, the Court shall find 
fair market value at the date of sale of the property 
sold. The Court may not render judgment for more 
than the" amount by which tfte amount ot indebtedness 
with interest, costs and expenses of sale, including 
Trustees and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair' 
market value of the property as of the date of the 
sale. (emphasis added) 
The appraisal obtained by Respondent in January, 1987 established 
the market value of the subject property to be $70,250.00. The 
amounts owing to the senior lien holder, Prudential, and 
Respondent was less than $68,000.00 at the time of foreclosure 
and sale of the subject property. The market value being greater 
than the amount of the indebtedness, a deficiency judgment could 
not be rendered against Appellant under the provisions of 57-1-32 
U.C.A. cited above. 
The action brought by Respondent against Appellant on the 
Promissory Note alleges two (2) causes of action, breach of 
contract and unjust enrichment. (R. 1-6) The remedy provided 
for by 78-37-1 U.C.A. is exclusive and precludes an action for 
breach of contract. Coburn v. Bartholowmew, 50 Ut. 566, 167 P. 
1156 (1917) Respondent cannot escape compliance with U.C.A. 
78-37-1 or 57-1-32 by bringing an action based on breach of 
contract or for unjust enrichment, in that the "One-Action Rule" 
is directly contrary to common law by which a creditor had a 
right to waive the security and bring such action. Smith v. 
Jarman , 61 Ut . 125, 211 P. 962 (1922) The action brought by 
Respondent for breach of contract is an apparent attempt to 
circumvent its statutorily imposed requirement to comply with the 
"One-Action Rule." In view of the undisputed facts, the above 
cited sections of the Utah Code, and applicable case law, 
Respondent is barred from pursuing the claimed deficiency against 
Appellant. 
POINT III 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS BY THE LOWER COURT WAS 
NOT PROPER. 
On the basis that the granting of the Motion for Summary 
Judgment by the lower Court was error and the action brought is 
barred by the "One-Action Rule," Respondent is not entitled to be 
awarded attorney's fees and costs. 
However, should this Court uphold the lower Court's granting 
of the Summary Judgment, the award of attorney's fees and costs 
should be vacated in that the Respondent did not establish that 
the hours claimed to have been expended in this case were 
reasonable and necessary in light of the nature of this case and 
the difficulty; or that the rate charged was the rate commonly 
charged for this type of action in the community. Trayner v. 
Cushing, 688 P.2d 856 (Ut. 1984). 
Respondent filed a Motion for Determination of Attorney's 
Fees supported by Affidavit. (R.84-92) A Memorandum of Costs 
required by Rule 54(d)(2) U.R.C.P. was not filed or submitted to 
the lower Court. Costs were merely included as a part of the 
Motion for Attorney's Fees. Appellant objected to the Affidavit 
for Attorney's Fees and Request for Costs on the basis that the 
Affidavit did not meet the test of Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 
P.2d 520 (Ut.) and the Request for Costs did not meet the 
requirements of Rule 54(d)(2). Reference was also made to an 
article in the Utah Law Review No. 3, 1984, page 533. (T.3-7) 
Over the objection of Appellant, the Court allowed counsel for 
Respondent to give testimony in an effort to cure the defective 
Affidavit. (T.9) Even with instructional help from the Court, 
counsel for Respondent failed to adequately establish the factors 
necessary for the award of attorney's fees other than his mere 
belief that the rate he charged was reasonable. Mr. Lundberg 
testified that the rate charged was set by his firm for all 
clientele without regard to specific matters. (T.10) The award 
of attorney's fees and costs was included in the Summary Judgment 
without preparation of Findings. Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694, P.2d 
622 (Ut. 1985) The award of attorney's fees and costs by the 
lower Court based on defective Affidavit, insufficient testimony 
and failure to file the required Memorandum of Costs was not 
proper and abuse of discretion. The award of attorney's fees and 
costs should be vacated. 
CONCLDSION 
Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Motion to Dismiss action of Respondent for failure 
to comply with 78-37-1, "One-Action Rule" raise sufficient 
material issues of fact which precluded the lower Court granting 
Summary Judgment. Respondent's noncompliance was uncontroverted 
other than to claim that the security was lost through no fault 
of its own and came within the exception to the "One-Action Rule" 
which is a material factual dispute to be proved by a 
preponderance. Respondent failed in its burden of proof. The 
facts clearly established the security was lost and Respondent 
was at "fault." 
Respondent cannot escape its statutorily imposed duty to 
first exhaust the security before proceeding with an action on 
the Note by mere speculation, "that in its opinion there was not 
economic justification for doing so." To allow Respondent to do 
so would render the statute (78-37-1) and existing case law 
meaningless. Respondent, in the hope it can avoid its legal 
obligation, should not be allowed to stand idle, allow the 
security with established value to be lost by the foreclosure of 
the senior lien holder, and then bring action on the Note for its 
claimed deficiency. The Summary Judgment should be reversed and 
Appellant's Motion to Dismiss the action of Respondent granted as 
a matter of law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
K
 KPMXlM H. FAftfcHMJSER ' 
At to rney for Defendan t /Appe l l an t 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I certify four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
was hand delivered to J. Scott Lundberg, Attorney for 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 175 East Fourth South, Suite 900, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111 on this fyd@ day of April, 1989. 
APPENDIX A 
Please return Documents to Vera Peters 1865 Wasatch Drive SLC 84108 
THIS iS A EGALLf B1ND1NG CCNTPACT IF NOT UNDERSTOOD SEE< COMPETENT AQVICE 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
3672262 —— 
1 THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this 6 t h day of. M a y , A D , 19 
by and between VERA C. HESS PETERS, formerly Vera C. Hess, a woman, 
hereinafter designated as the Seller, and ROBIN J . ERICKSON,—a woman, 
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of S a l t Lake C i t y . S a l t Lake County , S t a t e of Utah 
2. WITNESSETH That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer, 
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate in 
the county of Salt Lake , state of Utah, to-wit 1245 East S ies ta Dr., Sandy, Utah 
ADDRESS 
More particularly described as follows* 
Unit A, SIESTA DRIVE CONDOMINIUM, as the same is identified in the plat recorded 
in Book 78 at Page 244 and in the Enabling Declaration of Condominium recorded in 
Book 4729 at Page 1279 as Entry No. 31596369, of official records. 
Together witha 50% ownership interest in common and limited common areas and fa-
cilities, as described in plat and enabling declaration. Together with a right and 
easement of use and enjoyment in and to the common areas as described in and pro-
vided for in said enabling declaration of condominium. 
Together with one-half interest in ownership of swimming pool, (see below)** 
3. Paid Dujei heicbj agieej tu entei nitu pujJUJiun und paj fin jaid ducubml pieuiijui the sum uf 
" n.,iim. <a ) -
pojinhk nt thi nffirr nf Rrllrr. htn annignn irr rtriir • m 
*\tr*xT • l i l , m *•*«• fwHw—wE '-*—*! *"••<*» •• - •• • " • - • — (fr . ) 
».„••) t k . • • • • • f t n£ Mikiah !• h««»hy mmUmmmiU^fimiif mmd khm h w U w w mi ft »•> n «lmll h i URUI • « fiilliiww-
(See Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by reference made a part hereof) 
** Together with all window coverings, all light fixtures, gas log, all carpeting 
and oven. 
Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the 8 th dav 0f May t 1ft o*- . 
4. Said monthly payment* are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction ot the 
principal Interest shall be charged from May 8.,—1981 _,., on all unpaid portions of the 
purchase price at the rate of s e e Ex. "A" gey^jg^xXXXXXXXX^p^Xj^gfy
 T h e B u y e r > a t h l s o p t l o n a t a n y t i m e , 
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage 
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future 
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made. 
5 It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according 
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture 
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller 
6. It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of (1 ) P r u d e n t i a l 
Federal Savings (2) City Consumer Serv ices , Inc. ^ h
 a n unpaid balance of 
j (1) 54,353.70 (2) 18,761
 a s o f (1) May 1, 1981 (2) May 5, 1981 
7 Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said prem-
ises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said prop-
erty, except the following no e x c e p t i o n s 
8. The Salle* la giweai the option te •nawra, aaaaata and maintain laana toeiuad by gaid paapeaty ef net to oiieood the 
H—« tiwpairf *mm*va*t h w l a w I - M M H W . ^ P , hpwmwg m t o w U mk »tn iiifcii uf mrt til M i ' i w l . - •• • jwrvMHl 
t : _ _ — "H pei annum ami payable m regular monthly installments, ppewded- that the agpcgatc monthly installment 
paymante peajmaad te be made ay Sollee en aaid laana a ball net ha gaaatcp thaw g»«h installment payment requited to be 
made by the Bayoa andea tkta aantaaeti Whan the ppiaeipal due hepeandep has bean pedueed ta the amount uf unj jueh 
^ M and maptgagea the Belle* agpeea te-convey and the Buyep agpeoa la aaeapt title to the abo»e deexpibtd property 
subject te said loans and mortgages. 
9 It lll« Buytfl IJPSIIPJ lu eAEiuji liu iig.lit tlimu&h uimeleiated paymawtn nniiea thia agaaemant ta pay off any obli. 
•gat*ana outstanding at data af thia agaeomant against aaid property, it ahall ha tha Buyaa'a ohligatien ta aaaarae awd 
pay any penalty urhitib may ba aequiiied oa .prapayaaant of eaid prion ohliffntiona. Prepayment panaltiaa m aaapaet 
to obniauuwu against said ppepepty inenwu* by oeHePi aftop data ef thia agaaamanti ohall be paid ay- aellep unions 
said obligations ape aeaamed a» appaewad by buyagi 
10 Tlie Duyn a g i i u upon wi'itten gequeat af the Belaep ta mail a appliaatian ta a tellable lanrioa iea a lean ef iiwh 
amount as eawbe seeuped uwdep the pcgulatiena «i aaid lawdaa and haaohy najnaaa te apply any amount aa renewed upon 
the pwpahaea ppiee abawa mantunea1, and ta awaaata tka papepa ^e^Ml»ed and pay ana hatf the —ipanaaa aaaaaety in eb 
taming aaid leemi the fiallaa agaaaiwg ta pay the atkaa awa halfi paemdad hnniave*i that the mantbly paywaaata and 
mtapaat aata paa.wiaadt a ball net awaaad. the aaaaitkiy payaaanta and intaaeat aat» aa aatlmed nbavai 
11. The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed 
and which may become due on these premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees 
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following 
no exceptions 
The Seller further covenants and agrees that he will not default in the Davment of hia oblurmtiona irain«t «»iH
 nM«~.+» 
EXHIBIT "A" 
ATTACHED TO AND BY REFERENCE MADE A PART OF THAT CERTAIN UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CON-
TRACT DATED MAY 6, 1981, BY AND BETWEEN VERA C. HESS PETERS, formerly Vera C. 
Hess, a woman, as Seller, and ROBIN J. ERICKSON, a woman, as Buyer. 
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described 
premises, the sum of EIGHTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND NO/100 DOLLARS C$84,500), 
payable at the office of Seller, her assigns or oraer, said sales price to be paid 
as follows: $54,353.70 represented by a Trust Deed in favor of Prudential Service 
Corporation, dated June 18, 1979, recorded June 18, 1979 in Book 4882, Page 1260 
as Entry No. 3296175, of official records, payable at the rate of $601.00 per month 
and bearing interest at the rate of 11.25Z per annum. Buyer agrees to make all 
future payments, commencing June 1, 1981, on said Trust Deed obligation (Loan No. 
001-047713-3). It is understood and agreed that said monthly payments shall include 
the payment of general property taxes and hazard insurance premiums (insurance on 
structure only) and if said taxes and insurance premiums increase, the monthly pay-
ment due Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association shall increase accordingly; 
$18,761.00 represented by an obligation due to City Consumer Services, Inc., dated 
April 3C, 1981, payable at the idle of $293.23 per month and bearxn^ xui.eie&l at 
the rate of 16.50% per annum. Buyer agrees to make all future payments, commencing 
June 5, 1981 on feaid obligation, it being understood and agreed (by the terms of 
Disclosure Statement, Promissory Note and Closing Statement - a copy of which has 
been given to Buyer concurrently with the signing of this contract) that this ob-
ligation may be paid in full at any time without penalty. Seller's equity, in the 
amount of 11,385,30 shall be paid in full (with the exception of $100.00 principal), 
on or before November 1, 1981. No interest will be charged on Seller's equity if 
paid on or before August 1, 1981 and at the rate of 15% percent from May 8, 1981 
if not paid on or before that date and at 18% if paid at anytime after due date 
of November 1, 1981. Buyer agrees to pay any late charge assessments on any of 
the loans hereinabove set forth. The balance of beller's equity ($lu0.00) shall 
be paid by Buyer at time of assumption of the loan first above described or upon 
o» 
refinancing the subject property. 
WM &M^ ^/L STATE OF UTAH J////[ V^M^ Y77/U, |> 
County of X . Jfera C. Hess /Pe te r s 
Sal t Lake . . /„ , , x *-
OiOrhe V d a v - W ^ ^ /<f29y—A ( S e l l e r ) ^ 
V*ra ftess Pe te r s pe r sona l ly appeared .y •n ^ j j ' "N 
before we fh§u s igner of the f o r e - *J5flA/X,X J J (A^mJiyikJ £> 
going i^sVuuient , who dulv acknow- R0t{in J . Erffckso^ " *^ 
led^e ti> me^ C&hat she executed rhe same. r (Buver) 
DI^C ' : ^Residing in Sa l t Lake C i ty , Utah 
'f/V^/gs— 
Commission expires 
